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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
redemption; 15 (2) foreclosure by action; 16 or (3) foreclosure
by advertisement. 7 Since the conditional sales contract has
the "elements of a lien", the procedure in foreclosure is
governed by Chapter 32-20 of the North Dakota Century
Code.' s
The writer is of the opinion that the result in the principal
case is sound. However, the decision is somewhat limited
in that, in order to recover a deficiency, the contract must
expressly provide for it. Under certain circumstances, deny-
ing the conditional vendor the deficiency because it was not
expressly provided for in the contract would lead to inequita-
ble results. It is difficult to see why an express promise to
pay the deficiency should have any more effect than an
express promise to pay the purchase price.
LYNN HOGHAUG
CONFLICT OF LAWS-HUSBAND AND WIFE-INTERSPOUSAL
IMMUNITY DETERMINED ACCORDING TO LAW OF DOMICILE-
The plaintiff brought an action against her husband alleging
his negligence caused a motor vehicle accident in Massachu-
setts. Both parties were domiciled in New Hampshire where
a wife could maintain such an action against her husband.
Under Massachusetts law she could not. The Supreme Court
of New Hampshire held that the law of the domicile of the
parties determined whether the husband was immune from
liability to his wife. Thompson v Thompson, 193 A.2d 439
(N.H. 1963)
Interspousal immunity from suit is a common law
doctrine which developed because of the unity concept of
husband and wife.' Although Married Women's Acts have
virtually abrogated that concept, 2 many states still prohibit
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-07 (1961).
17. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-08 (1961).
18. Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Pfeiffle, supra note 9, at 375.
1. Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 66 (1962) Rains v. Rains, 46
P.2d 740, 741 (Colo. 1935) Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772, 773(1962). See generally PRossER, TORTS 671 (2d ed. 1955).
2. See Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95, 96 (Alaska 1963), Brown v. Gosser,
262 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Ky. 1953) Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242
N.W 626, 529 (1932). See generally PRossm, TORTS 672 (2d ed. 1955).
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interspousal suits, contending they disrupt domestic harmony
and encourage collusive suits.3 Other states disagree with
these policy arguments and allow interspousal litigation.'
A perplexing choice of laws problem is presented when, as
in the instant case, a husband and wife, domiciled in a state
with one view toward interspousal immunity, have an accident
in a state with the opposite view, and one of the spouses
§ues the other
A court confronted with the question of intra-family
immunity from suit is given three choices of law- (1) the
law of the forum (lex fori), (2) the law of the place of injury
(lex locL delicti), and (3) the law of the domicile of the parties
(lex domicili) The courts have been almost universal in
their application of the lex loci delicti. They say7 that
capacity to sue is "substantive" and that, because a tort is
involved, the prevailing torts choice of laws rule" applies.
This view, applied to interspousal litigation, had its beginning
in the 1931 case of Buckeye v Buckeye. 9 Writings condemning
that case and the rule evolving therefrom are voluminous. 10
A few cases have held that where the lexi loct delictl is
repugnant to the policy of the forum, the forum will decide
the question of capacity to sue according to its own law 11
3. E.g., Bedell v. Reagan, 192 A.2d 24, 26 (Me. 1963) Pelowski v. Freder-
ickson, 263 Minn. 371, 116 N.W.2d 701, 703 (1962) Fowler v. Fowler, 130 S.E.2d
252, 253 (Tex. 1962).
4. E.g., Klien v. Kilen, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 70, 72 (1962) , Fitzmaurice
v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W 526, 529 (1932) Courtney v. Courtney,
87 P.2d 660, 668 (Oki. 1939) , Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 653, 251 P.2d
149, 155 (1952).
5. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
6. E.g., LaChance v. Service Trucking Co., 215 F Supp. 159 (D.D.Md. 1963)
iWolozin v. Wolozin, 149 Conn. 507, 182 A.2d 8, 9 (1962), Robinson v.
Gaines, 331 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1960) Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d
509 (1943) Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1963).
7. Ibid.
8. The prevailing torts choice of laws rule is that creation of tort liability
is governed by the law of the state where the Injury occurred. RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934). And that state is the state where the last
event necessary to make an actor liable for the alleged tort takes place. Sestito
v. Knop, 297 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1961). The American Law Institute has under
consideration a proposal to modify the rigid rule set out in the 1934 Restatement.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 370 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963)
"(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with
the occurance and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in
tort."
9. 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W 342 (1931).
10. Ford, Interspoutsal Liability for Automobile Accidents tit the Conflict of
Laws Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15 U. PITT. L.REv. 397 (1954)
Hancock, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 1931-1959, Marital Im-
munity for Torts in Conflicts of Laws, 29 U. CHI. L.REv. 237 (1962) Rhein-
stein, Michigan Legal Studies A Review, 41 MICH. L.REv. 83, 97 (1942) Tray-
nor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TEXAS L.REv. 657, 669 (1959).
11. Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N.W 120 (1939) Kyle v. Kyle,
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It was not until 1955, however, that a court held that intra-
family immunities should be governed by the lex domicili."2
In 1959 Wisconsin 13 expressly overruled Buckeye v Buckeye, 14
and the instant case is an indication that other states will
discard the Buckeye rule. The rationale of this new line of
cases is that incapacity to sue because of family status pre-
sents a question of family law rather than tort law, and since
questions of family law are determined according to the law
of the domicile of the parties, that law applies. 15 The courts
have been careful to point out that this new rule is not a
rejection of the general torts choice of laws rule.16
While most writers would agree with the result reached
in this new trend, many would use a different approach.
Rather than applying artificial choice of laws rules, they
advocate a forthright analysis of the underlying policies with
a view toward determining which jurisdiction has the greater
interest in having its policy advanced.17
This writer agrees with the proponents of the policy
centered approach.' 8
210 Minn. 204, 297 N.W 744 (1941) Koplik v. C.P Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1,.
141 A.2d 34 (1958) Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936) Poling v.
Poling, 116 W Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
12. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) "We think that
disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a family relationship are
more properly determined by reference to the law of the state of the family
domicile. That state has the primary responsibility for establishing and regulat-
ing the incidents of the family relationship and it is the only state in which the
parties can, by participation in the legislative 'processes, effect a change in those
incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities, and
immunities conferred or imposed by the family relationship should constantly
change as members of the family cross state boundaries during temporary ab-
sences from their home." Id. at 426, 289 P.2d at 223.
13. Haumschild v, Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
14. Supra note 9.
15. Emery v. Emery, supra note 5 Thompson v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 430
(N.H. 1963) Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., supra note 13. This rule has
been construed to mean that when the forum state and the state of the acci-
dent are the same the law of the domicile will still be applied. Haynie v. Han-
son, 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114 N.W.2d 443 (1962).
16. Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 15, at 441 Haumschild v. Continental
Cas. Co., supra note 13, at 819 " the instant decision should not be interpreted
as a rejection of the general rule that ordinarily the substantive rights of
parties to an action in tort are to be determined in light of the law of the
place of wrong."
17. E.g., Hancock, The Rise and Fall of Buckeye v. Buckeye, 1931-1959
Marital Immunity for Torts in Conflicts of Laws, 29 U. Ciii. L. REV. 237 (1962)
Harper, Policy Bases of the Conflicts of Laws Reflections on Rereading Pro-
fessor Lorenzen's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155 (1947) Weintraub, A Method for
Solving Conflicts Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215 (1963).
18. There is a definite trend in this country toward the policy centered ap-
proach. Some courts have already adopted a freer approach than that of the
original Restatement. See e.g., Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82
N.W.2d 365 (1957) of. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1961). Recently
the New York Court of Appeals in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191
N.E.2d 279 (1963) explicitly adopted the proposed revision of the Restatement.,
See note 8 supra.
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Although courts following the rule herein discussed will
alleviate some inequities in cases falling within its narrow
scope, its effect on the unjust results produced by the current
rigid application of the prevailing torts choice of laws rule
will be minimal.
LARRY KRAFT
